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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
JEFFREY HOUSTON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20050535-CA 
ARGUMENTS. 
POINT III (CONTINUED). 
THE STATE IMPERMISSIBLY REQUEST THIS COURT TO PRESUME 
REGULARITIES IN THE PROCEEDINGS; IN STEAD OF INDULGING THE 
PRESUMPTION OF NO WAIVER OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AND 
REQUIRING THE STATE TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THROUGH 
SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE RECORD, AS REQUIRED BY THE COURTS. 
In this matter, the record reflects that Mr. Houston was indigent. R. at 344-348. That 
finding was made on January 28, 2005, apparently following Defendant's conviction of thirteen 
counts of Precursor violations all second degree felonies. The finding of the court prior to trial 
on January 26, 2005 was that the request was untimely claiming that Mr. Houston had ample 
opportunity to retain counsel. T-l, at 8. However, as the record also reflects Mr. Houston did 
have counsel for near two years - Margret Taylor, but for her ineffective assistance of counsel 
prior to trial, he would have fee^ represented by an attorney at the time of trial. R. at 280. The 
• W 
court inappropriate attributed Ms. Taylor's failures and delay upon Mr. Houston and permitted 
her withdrawal simply alleging the appearance of a conflict. Its bad enough that counsel 
inappropriately waived Mr. Houston's right to a preliminary hearing without his consent or 
knowledge but its quite another that her personal agenda to legalize drugs actually resulted in 
additional charges against him being applied in the State's two amended Informations. See, i.e., 
R. at 76, 80, 83 233, 235, 242, 258 & 261. 
The matter before the Court as characterized by the State is that Mr. Houston abandoned 
or otherwise waived his right to counsel. Appellee's Br. pp. 10-20. In its arguments that State 
allegations are two-fold. One, the State claims that the presumption is one of regularity rather 
than the presumption against a waiver of a fundamental constitutional right as argued by 
Houston. Appellee's Br. p. 15; Aplt's Br. pp. 33-37. The next contention raised by the State is 
that Houston abandoned his right to counsel by conduct, but there is an inadequate record to 
prove it. Appellee's Br. pp. 12-16. This reply brief is submitted to address both propositions. 
A. Defendant Houston Did Not Waive His Riffht To Counsel and It is The State's 
Burden To Prove That a Waiver Did Occur. 
In reviewing the issues before this Court is it important to consider what aspects did not 
occur, to wit: Whether Mr. Houston requested to represent himself; whether he was offered 
choices; or whether Mr. Houston refused assistance of counsel? 
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I. Self-Representation Request and Assistance of Counsel Presumption. 
The Utah Supreme Court reviewed, the right of self-representation in State v. Bakalov. 
979 P.2d 799 (Utah 1999). In that matter, the Supreme Court required that record must show that 
the defendant's "'clearly and unequivocally'" requested it. Id., at 808 (citing United States v. 
McKinlev. 58 F.3d 1475, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Reddeck. 22 F.3d 
1504, 1510 (10th Cir. 1994)). The requirement that a defendant make an explicit request ensures 
that the defendant will not unthinkingly waive the right to counsel through sporadic musings or, 
on appeal, mischaracterize statements he made in the trial court and claim that he was denied the 
benefit of counsel if he proceeded pro se, or that he was denied the right to self-representation if 
he was represented by counsel. See Adams v. Carroll 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989). If a 
defendant equivocates in his request to represent himself, he is presumed to have requested the 
assistance of counsel. See Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 
(1938). A defendant's assertion of the right of self-representation must be voluntary, the product 
of a free and meaningful choice. See State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987). 
In this matter, it is clear by the record that Mr. Houston did not request to represent 
himself. Early on, on January 7, 2003, Mr. Houston requested to hire private counsel. R. at 3; 
Appellee's Br. at "Add. B." It is equally clear that he did not refuse the assistance of counsel 
either. T-l, at 8; Aplt's Br. p. 14. Before trial commenced, the Court addressed the 
circumstances surrounding Houston's request for counsel be appointed and the timeliness of 
Houston's filing of an Affidavit of Indigency. T-l, at 8-11. 
Having concluded Mr. Houston had not timely requested his right to representation, the 
Court however said nothing to protect Houston through honoring the presumption that Mr. 
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Houston was otherwise entitled to the assistance of counsel nonetheless. See Johnson v. Zerbst 
304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938). Even though the findings of the Court 
were one of untimeliness, the findings were clearly erroneous. Under the circumstances, 
Houston's conduct was "excusable neglect" addressed below. 
IL Defendant's Choices Concerning Representation/Self-Representation. 
In this matter, the Court failed to offer Houston any substantial choices either. A 
defendant cannot be forced to proceed with incompetent counsel or counsel having a conflict of 
interests: "[A] choice between proceeding with incompetent counsel or no counsel is in essence 
no choice at all." Wilks v. Israel 627 F.2d 32, 36 (7th Cir. 1980). Requiring a defendant to 
choose between self-representation and some other course of action does not always enable a 
defendant to make a totally voluntary decision. "If a choice presented to a petitioner is 
constitutionally offensive, then the choice cannot be voluntary." IdL However, if the defendant's 
options are constitutionally sound, the choice between alternatives is voluntary. See id. In this 
case, Mr. Houston was not given the choice of private counsel or public defender. The only time 
that offer was made was at the outset, on January 7, 2003. R. at 3; Appellee's Br. "Add. B." 
After Houston hired private counsel, Margret Taylor, Houston received ineffective assistance as 
counsel as described in Houston's opening brief at pages 5-12. In June 2003, Ms. Taylor filed a 
motion to dismiss arguing her own agenda seeking to legalize drugs. R. at 56. Ms. Taylor 
waived without consulting Mr. Houston his right to a preliminary hearing, of which Mr. Houston 
denies agreeing to waive. R. at 146; T-l, at 8. Ms. Taylor missed a motion to suppress filing 
deadline causing Houston to lose another opportunity to weigh the State's evidence. R. at 233, 
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237. Ms. Taylor then filed a motion to sever the seventeen counts asserting prejudice at trial only 
to then withdraw the motion without a judicial opinion. R. at 240, 242, 255, 265. Subsequently 
at the day of a cancelled trial where a change of plea had been hoped for, Ms. Taylor motioned 
for a withdrawal as counsel and was granted the motion, on the grounds "there appears to be a 
conflict between the defendant and his counsel." R. at 180. The decision of the Court was 
constitutionally offensive and prejudicial, and is not adequately supported by proper findings 
including concerning the nature of conflict, desire of the defendant, inability of counsel as an 
officer of the court to rise about the conflict, alternative assistance of counsel, availability of a 
substitution, etc. 
In summation, the State cannot meet its burden to show that Houston had a voluntary 
choice in the loss of his counsel, Margret Taylor. The decision to release Ms. Taylor is 
unequivocally the choice of counsel and was permitted by the Court without additional warning 
to the defendant or any information elucidating other options. 
III. No Abandonment by Intent or Implied by Alleged Conduct. 
The two issues above are not disputed between the parties. The disputed issue presented 
by the State in it's responsive brief is whether Mr. Houston waived his right to counsel through 
his conduct. Appellee's Br. pp. 16-20. The State contends that Mr. Houston waived his right to 
counsel by his conduct. The record states, "[AJfter Ms. Margret Taylor's services were 
terminated on November 18, 2004, the court ordered defendant to appear before the court on 
several occasions and advise the court on his progress in hiring counsel." R. at 526. The Court 
continued, "Each time the court admonished . . . the importance of employing counsel but 
5 
defendant procrastinated the hiring of counsel even though he was working in the coal mines." 
Id The State, in its responsive brief, at page 19, argues, "These statements suggest that the court 
properly warned defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . . 
Defendant has not presented a record upon which this Court can review his claim that the trial 
court failed to adequately warning (sic) him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation." Appellee Br. p. 19. From this remark, the State urges this Court to adopt the 
belief this Court must "assume that the trial court adequately warned defendant of the 
consequences of dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and that his waiver was 
knowing and intelligent." Appellee's Br. p. 20. The argument of the State is belied by the court 
record. 
The record fails to identify any kind of colloquy and the State failed to attempt to a 
supplementation of the record if it thought such a colloquy existed. See, e.g., State v. Frampton, 
737 P.2d 183, 188 (Utah 1987) (example of colloquy). The fact is the court's minutes failed to 
suggest where a colloquy might of even occurred. In Frampton, the Supreme Court directed the 
following or similar instructions were necessary: 
(a) Have you ever studied law? 
(b) Have you ever represented yourself or any other defendant in a criminal action? 
(c) You realize, do you not, that you are charged with these crimes: (Here state the 
crimes with which the defendant is charged.) 
(d) You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty of the crime charged in Count I, 
the court... could sentence you to as much as years in prison and fine you as much 
as $ ? (Then ask him a similar question with respect to each other crime with 
which he may be charged in the indictment or information.) 
(e) You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty of more than one of those 
crimes this court can order that the sentences be served consecutively, that is, one after 
another? 
(f) You realize, do you not, that if you represent yourself, you are on your own? I 
cannot tell you how you should try your case or even advise you as to how to try your 
case. 
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(g) Are you familiar with the ... Rules of Evidence? 
(h) You realize, do you not, that the ... Rules of Evidence govern what evidence may or 
may not be introduced at trial and, in representing yourself, you must abide by those 
rules? 
(i) Are you familiar with the ... Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
(j) You realize, do you not, that those rules govern the way in which a criminal action is 
tried in ... court? 
(k) You realize, do you not, that if you decide to take the witness stand, you must 
present your testimony by asking questions of yourself? You cannot just take the stand 
and tell your story. You must proceed question by question through your testimony. 
(1) (Then say to the defendant something to this effect): I must advise you that in my 
opinion you would be far better defended by a trained lawyer than you can be by yourself. 
I think it is unwise of you to try to represent yourself. You are not familiar with the law. 
You are not familiar with court procedure. You are not familiar with the Rules of 
Evidence. I would strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself. 
(m) Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if you are found guilty and in 
light of all the difficulties of representing yourself, is it still your desire to represent 
yourself and to give up your right to be represented by a lawyer? 
(n) Is your decision entirely voluntary on your part? 
(o) If the answers to the two preceding questions are in the affirmative, you should then 
say something to the following effect: "I find that the defendant has knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel. I will therefore permit him to represent himself." 
(p) You should consider the appointment of standby counsel to assist the defendant and 
to replace him if the court should determine during trial that the defendant can no longer 
be permitted to represent himself. 
Id., at 188. No where in the record for the dates of January 7, 2003, November 18, 2004, 
December 7, 2004, January 4, 2005, and January 19, 2005 does the record suggest 
a colloquy. At no point was it the intentions of Mr. Houston to represent himself. At all stages 
Mr. Houston wanted to be represented by counsel. Instead, the Court on January 26, 2005, 
required Mr. Houston on the morning of his trial to represent himself. In response, the defendant 
requested a continuance. T-l, 17-18. 
The State's contentions without citation to the record that Mr. Houston was warned, 
repeatedly to obtain counsel, or else he was lose his right to counsel is inappropriate. No such 
admonishment from the bench occurred. "Courts should indulge every reasonable presumption 
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against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." State v. Meinhart 617 P.2d 355, 357 (Utah 
1990) (quoting from Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 
(1938). "When human life is at stake, it is the duty of the court to interfere ad see that the 
defendant is not deprived of a fair t r i a l . . . . A conviction contrary to the weight of the evidence 
will be set aside." People of the Territory of Utah v. Thiede. 11 Utah 241, 39 P. 837 (1895) 
(citations omitted). In this matter, the overwhelming weight of the evidence presented in the 
record casts serious doubt that the trial Mr. Houston was afforded was fair, including the 
assistance of counsel. 
The trial was unfair to Defendant. It is well settled without a need to provide citation. 
The burden of proof in a criminal trial is proof beyond reasonable doubt. The trial in this matter 
without the assistance of counsel resulted in a conviction upon "uncorroborated hearsay." The 
Supreme Court of the United States, in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 
L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971), has held that "Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute 
substantial evidence." "Substantial evidence" is a far lower burden of proof. The Supreme 
Court defined "substantial evidence" as meaning "more than a mere scintilla. It means such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id., at 
401. The testimony of Jennifer McNair was uncorroborated hearsay as to the work performed 
by Kevin Smith, a Senior Criminalist at the State Crime Lab, and the testimony of clandestine 
labs and the conduct of others was all pure rumor. T-l, 43-45. At trial, McNair admitted the 
work was performed by Kevin Smith and she affirmatively testified that she did not test the 
substance limiting herself to a review of Smith's materials only. T-l, 45. Having either 
representation at the time of trial, or even the assistance of counsel at trial, a law-trained attorney 
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competent in the profession, would have avoided the admission of such uncorroborated hearsay 
and rumors which are absolutely inadmissible in a criminal trial. The only way the lab results 
would be corroborated is if the testifying expert had tested the contraband herself. Admittedly, 
that did not occur. T-l, at 45. 
Here in this matter, the State contends that the presumption of regularity is the standard 
and suggests that the record was inadequate for this Court to consider the issue of Mr. Houston's 
claim for right of counsel. That presumption of regularity, generally is the norm. However, 
given the fact that the right to counsel at trial is a fundamental right. The presumption is against 
a waiver as noted in State v. Meinhart, 617 P.2d 355 (Utah 1980) and Johnson v. Zerbst 304 
U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed 1461 (1938). The request by the State to assume 
regularity in the district court proceedings is impermissible concerning the waiver of 
constitutional rights. The State bears a strict burden of showing an alleged waiver of a 
constitutional right, including the right to counsel at trial. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 241, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2055, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). The strict standard of waiver has been 
applied to those rights guaranteed to a criminal defendant to insure that he will be accorded the 
greatest possible opportunity to utilize every facet of the constitutional model of a fair criminal 
trial. IcL, at 241; see also, State v. Bolsinger. 699 P.2d 1214, 1222 (Utah 1985). In light of the 
State's strict burden imposed by Bustamonte and Bolsingen the proper course of action the State 
should have taken if it truly believed the record was inadequate was to seek a supplementation of 
the record in order to demonstrate a waiver occurred. Even the findings of the judge on the day 
of trial contradicts the State's assertion, however. The right to have the assistance of counsel in a 
criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be jealously protected by the trial 
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court. State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998). The day of trial, the judge made findings, its 
findings failed to reveal a colloquy. Moreover, the findings failed to properly state facts which 
could leave a reasonable jurist to believe a waiver occurred. In stead, the findings admittedly 
only attempted to justify the court's desire to find that the affidavit of indigency was untimely. 
Even that conclusion was not properly adduced by the Court. If an accused is indigent, he is 
entitled to court-appointed counsel. See State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1986). 
Timing has little to do with it. 
Given the fact that no waiver or abandonment occurred, this Court should reverse and 
remand. In order to find that an abandonment occurred, the State has the strict burden to 
demonstrate a waiver. In the alternative, the State would be required to seek supplementation of 
the record to reveal rebuttal evidence to a defendants affirmative statements that the right had 
been denied. The State's suggestion of handling the appeal by drawing inferences from a 
presumption of regularity is not the established approach. The proper means to handle the issue 
is to presume a violation of a constitutional right and permit the State to rebut the presumption. 
Barnard v. Wasserman, 855 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993) (although courts indulge a presumption 
against waiver of constitutional rights, the presumption is rebuttable); Pitts v. Board of Educ, 
869 F.2d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1989). Waiver is deemed to occur when the totality of the 
circumstances indicates an intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known constitutional 
right. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981); Johnson 
v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938); Pitts, 869 F.2d at 557. 
And that Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64, 77 L. Ed. 158, holds to 
constitute due process of law in his trial the defendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at 
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every step in the proceedings against him," unless he intelligently and understandingly waives 
counsel. Because the determination that a defendant has intelligently waived his right to counsel 
"turns 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the 
background, experience, and conduct of the accused,'" id, at 732 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst 
304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938)), the constitutionality of an 
accused's waiver of the right to counsel is a mixed question involving both fact and law. See 
State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah App. 1996). In this matter, there is no showing of a 
intentional and knowing abandonment. Quite to the contrary, Houston sought a finding of 
indigency as requested of him by the Court through the submission of an affidavit. R. at 344-
346. The fact that it was deficient should be evidence alone of Mr. Houston's inability to 
effectively represent himself. T-l, at 11. The only question before this Court is whether Mr. 
Houston made a good faith attempt to secure new counsel or whether he knowingly and 
intentionally by acting dilatory knowingly and intentionally abandoned his right to counsel. Mr. 
Houston denies that he acted dilatory. He also denies abandoning his right to counsel. If this 
Court wants to find that Mr. Houston neglected to obtain counsel timely, the Court should also 
find under the totality of the circumstances the neglect was excusable, as so should have the trial 
judge. 
B. Under the Totality of the Circumstances, Excusable Neglect Exists Even if the State 
Rebuts the Presumption. 
Excusable neglect has been approved as "good cause." Clearly the facts occurring before 
the trial judge the days leading into trial stated above constitute "good cause." The failure to 
timely service is without dispute "neglect." The pivotal question then for the Court to decide is 
whether the explanation provided under all the circumstances is "excusable" even if the State 
were able to rebut the State's initial presumption. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has noted that "excusable neglect" is a 
"somewhat elastic concept," not limited exclusively to omissions caused by circumstances 
outside the moving party's control, but which must be assessed in view of all relevant 
circumstances surrounding the omission. Pioneer Inv. Serves. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. 
Fship, 507 U.S. 380, 390-95, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1496-98, 123 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1993) (construing 
excusable neglect in context of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), which was patterned after Rule 6(b)). 
POINT IV. 
THE STATE'S RELIANCE ON PEDOCKIE IS SUPPORTIVE OF HOUSTON; 
HOWEVER, THE STATE MISCONSTRUES THE CASE AGAINST HOUSTON. 
In this matter, the State relies on Pedockie, 2006 UT 28,1J33 (Utah Supreme Court, May 
12, 2006); that reliance is misplaced and is apparently misrepresented. The State argues, "An 
implied waiver, like a true waiver, in addition to being voluntary, must also be 'knowing and 
intelligent.' Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ^  33 (citing Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1102). In other words, in 
addition to knowing the consequences of continued misconduct, the defendant must cpossess[] an 
awareness of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation at the time of the implied 
waiver.' Id. '[T]the trial court must ensure that the defendant is cognizant of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation' and that his waiver is therefore knowing and intelligent. Id. 
at U 38." A review ofPedockie, Attachment "A," demonstrate it is clearly supporting of Mr. 
Houston's contentions. On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court held that Pedockie voluntarily 
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waived his right to counsel through his dilatory conduct. It nevertheless, reversed his conviction, 
holding that the waiver was not knowing and intelligent. The Supreme Court then affirmed the 
reversal of the conviction, but on different grounds. The Court stated, "Like the court of appeals, 
we recognize that an accused may voluntarily waive his right to counsel through his conduct. 
But we find no such voluntary waiver in this case." Pedockie's conduct more egregious than 
suggested about Houston, if the Courts could not agree with the district court that a waiver of 
counsel occurred there, this Court should not find that such a waiver was the result here. Just as 
in this case, the Court of Appeals, this Court, stated that it need not decide the question of 
"knowing and intelligent" because there was "nothing in the record to persuade [it] that 
[Pedockie's] waiver was knowing and intelligent." Inasmuch as the issues and the likely 
outcomes between this appeal and Pedockie, the State should have agreed to remand this matter 
as the controlling case law is adverse to the State's position. 
MOTION FOR FRIVOLOUS FINDINGS. 
Consequently, this Court should find that the State's defense on appeal is without merit 
and is therefore frivolous. With a finding of a frivolous defense on appeal, Houston requests an 
award of damages, the recovery of attorney's fees and the award of costs pursuant to both Rule 
33 & 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures. Upon request of the Court, a memorandum 
of costs and an affidavit of attorney's foes shall be provided. 
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CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Houston requests this court to vacate the Defendant's 
conviction for loss of jurisdiction in the course of the proceedings for not providing a complete 
court - as the Sixth Amendment the court cannot deprive the accused of counsel at trial. Also, 
the defendant was deprived effective assistance of counsel during his near two year pretrial 
proceedings. It was error for the defendant's counsel to be permitted to withdraw two months 
before trial without cause particularly since her conduct had prejudiced the defendant and her 
reign of representations lasted for nearly two years, resulting in the loss of suppression issues, the 
failure to sever prejudicial claims, repeated continuances, the lack of preparation for trial, no 
witnesses being called for his defense, and the apparent waiver of a preliminary hearing. 
Meanwhile, it is obvious that the arresting officer and agents of the State had zero probable cause 
to arrest Mr. Houston and to seize his lawfully purchased crystal iodine. At the time of arrest, 
Det. Funk knew from Mr. Houston and the Emery Animal Clinic both that Houston was a farrier 
and that he had a history of purchasing iodine crystals and iodine solution both from the clinic, 
and that he had acquired the general reputation as being a farrier according to employees of the 
clinic. Then following the arrest, during the interview, the agents and officers exploited Mr. 
Houston and his circumstances by forcing an appearing consensual confession, when "but for" 
the false arrest and the false representations of leniency by a lawyer made in light of Miranda, the 
confession never would have been obtained. 
Because the State's defense to Houston's appeal is frivolous in light of State v. Pedockie, 
2006 UT 28 (Supreme Court, May 12, 2006), damages, reimbursement of attorney's fees, and 
costs should be provided pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
PARRISH, Justice: 
ill Defendant Robert Brian Pedockie was charged with 
aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony. During pretrial 
proceedings, Pedockie was represented by a string of various 
public defenders and private attorneys, all of whom either 
withdrew or were fired. Despite Pedockie's invocation of his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the trial court allowed the 
trial to proceed with Pedockie representing himself. Pedockie 
was convicted and appealed. 
^2 The court of appeals held that Pedockie voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel through his dilatory conduct. It 
nevertheless reversed his conviction, holding that the waiver was 
not knowing and intelligent. We affirm the reversal of 
Pedockie's conviction, but on different grounds. Like the court 
of appeals, we recognize that an accused may voluntarily waive 
his right to counsel through his conduct. But we find no such 
voluntary waiver in this case. 
F I L E D 
May 12, 2 0 06 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1)3 We recite the facts in a manner consistent with the 
jury's verdict. On January 3, 2001, Pedockie and his cousin 
kidnapped Nicole Sather, Pedockie's ex-girlfriend. When Sather 
attempted to escape from Pedockie's truck, Pedockie's cousin shot 
at her, and Pedockie restrained her. The next day, Pedockie 
threatened to kill Sather and himself. When Pedockie stopped for 
gas, Sather escaped with the help of a gas station employee. 
Pedockie was later arrested and charged with aggravated 
kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
section 76-5-302.1 
1(4 At Pedockie's initial appearance on February 20, 2001, 
the trial judge found Pedockie indigent and appointed the Weber 
County Public Defenders' Association ("PDA") to defend him. The 
judge also gave Pedockie a copy of the Information that had been 
filed and advised him of the charges against him and the 
potential penalties associated therewith. Pedockie requested 
disposition of his case according to the Speedy Trial Statute, 
which entitles a defendant who is imprisoned to be tried within 
120 days of the request.2 At a later hearing, the judge set 
Pedockie's jury trial for August 13, 2001. 
%S On August 1, 2001, at the request of Pedockie's PDA 
attorney, who needed additional time to prepare, the trial judge 
continued the trial to December 10, 2001. The trial was 
subsequently continued to February 4, 2 002, to accommodate a 
conflict in the prosecutor's schedule. 
%6 Scheduling conflicts, however, were not the only 
difficulties arising during pretrial proceedings. Difficulties 
between Pedockie and his attorneys were a recurring theme. 
Pedockie's first two PDA attorneys withdrew, through no fault of 
Pedockie, because one had a conflict of interest and the other 
lost his contract with the PDA. And less than a month before 
trial, Pedockie's third PDA attorney, James Retallick, also moved 
to withdraw. 
1|7 Retallick informed the trial judge that Pedockie was 
insisting that he file four motions that Retallick believed were 
"absolutely frivolous." Although Retallick had explained to 
Pedockie why he could not in good faith file the motions, 
Pedockie nevertheless believed that Retallick was not 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999). 
2
 Id. 
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representing his best interests and requested the appointment of 
a PDA attorney who would file them. The trial judge explained 
that Pedockie did not have a right to "pick and choose" an 
attorney from the PDA, stating, "I can appoint an attorney to 
work with you but if you don't want to accept his advice, you've 
either got to represent yourself or get your own attorney." 
Pedockie stated that he did not wish to proceed pro se and agreed 
to have Retallick continue the representation. The next day, 
however, Pedockie fired him. 
1|8 A couple of weeks later, Pedockie requested that the 
judge release the PDA office because he had hired private 
attorney Ed Brass to represent him. Stating that Pedockie was 
entitled to legal representation, the trial judge granted his 
request and continued the trial to April 15, 2002, to give Brass 
time to prepare. 
%9 Three days before trial, Brass moved to withdraw as 
counsel, stating that he had an ethical conflict with Pedockie 
that made representation impossible. Brass was unwilling to stay 
on the case as standby counsel because he did not believe that 
Pedockie was "sophisticated enough to handle a first degree 
felony trial" without full-time counsel. The trial judge 
reluctantly granted Brass's motion to withdraw, stating, "I want 
Mr. Pedockie to understand, I'm not gonna continue this case 
again . . . . [Y]ou either get an attorney who will represent you 
on the matter or you're just gonna represent yourself next time 
it's scheduled." 
HlO On May 1, Pedockie appeared in court without an 
attorney and reported that he was still attempting to hire one. 
The judge continued the case until May 2 9 and again admonished 
Pedockie to get an attorney. But on May 29, Pedockie again 
appeared without counsel, explaining that he had been unable to 
find an attorney to file his motion for prosecutorial misconduct 
because "[e]verybody thinks it's unethical to bring." 
Ull The trial judge warned Pedockie that he was going to 
set the case for trial and that Pedockie would have to get an 
attorney or proceed without one. Pedockie emphasized the 
seriousness of his case, explaining that "you're talking about my 
ce at stake." The prosecutor asked the judge to make a record 
Pedockie's "election to represent himself at the time of 
is voluntary and knowing." The judge responded that "the 
m is he doesn't want to represent himself. . . . But on 
,w*r side, every time we give him an attorney or have him 
attorney, the attorney withdraws." When Pedockie 
.^ that he wanted another attorney appointed who would 
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file his motions, the judge stated, "See, that's the problem. 
You need to start following the advice of the attorney that's 
representing you instead of you trying to tell him what to do." 
1l2 After scheduling trial for September 30, 2002, the 
trial judge informed Pedockie that he could hire a private 
attorney, but warned him that the trial would not be continued 
again. The trial judge also appointed standby counsel, but 
clarified that Pedockie was still responsible for filing and 
arguing his own motions. 
Kl3 At a July 31 hearing, Pedockie announced that he had 
hired Paul Grant as his attorney but that Grant had indicated he 
was going to withdraw. Pedockie asked the judge to appoint 
primary counsel who could assist him in arguing his motions, and 
the judge chastised him for his unwillingness to follow the 
advice of his prior attorneys. But when Pedockie persisted, the 
trial judge relented: 
The Court: I can appoint the public 
defenders' office. I cannot pick and choose 
which attorney represents you. There are at 
least three people in that office that you've 
had, and now they no longer can represent 
you. So do you want the public defenders' 
office or not? 
Mr. Pedockie: As of right now, I'd like to — 
I need a attorney--
The Court: Okay. 
Mr. Pedockie: --Unless you're gonna--
The Court: I'll appoint the public 
defenders' office for the third time then. 
Okay. 
A hearing on Pedockie's motions was then set for August 12. 
Thereafter, the trial judge indicated that Pedockie needed to 
give a copy of his motions to the PDA attorney prior to the 
hearing, and the clerk suggested that they coordinate with the 
PDA to make sure August 12 was an acceptable date. All of this 
was consistent with the fact that the PDA had been appointed to 
act as Pedockie's primary, rather than standby, counsel. 
1|14 Prison officials failed to transport Pedockie to the 
August 12 hearing. In Pedockie's absence, the trial judge 
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informed Martin Gravis, the PDA attorney who had been assigned to 
represent Pedockie following the July 31 hearing, that he "was 
not inclined to appoint a public defender" for Pedockie and that 
Gravis was there only in the capacity as standby counsel. The 
motion hearing was then rescheduled for the following day. 
1|l5 The next day, Pedockie expressed surprise and confusion 
when he learned that Gravis was acting only as standby counsel 
and would not argue the motions. Pedockie again requested that 
the court appoint an attorney to argue his motions, emphasizing 
their importance to his case and his desire to see them argued 
properly. The trial judge declined, indicating that he would not 
appoint an attorney because of Pedockie's insistence that his 
attorneys pursue unethical courses of action. The judge 
reiterated that, if Pedockie wanted an attorney, he would have to 
hire one himself. 
1|16 During a hearing on August 21, the trial judge again 
scolded Pedockie, refused to appoint an attorney, and informed 
Pedockie that he must hire a private attorney or proceed pro se. 
He told Pedockie that his attorneys have "always asked to be 
recused because you want them to do something that's illegal 
that's a violation of the Canons of Ethics." Pedockie insisted 
that he could not afford a private attorney and that he was 
invoking his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
%11 At a September 18 pretrial conference, Pedockie failed 
to submit the jury instructions that his standby counsel had 
prepared and again requested that an attorney be appointed to 
represent him. The trial judge refused, stating that he had 
waived his right to counsel. 
|^18 Pedockie's jury trial began on September 30, 2002. 
Pedockie again requested counsel, complaining that he was neither 
"educated nor familiar with the rules and proceedings" of the 
court and did not know how many juror challenges he had. The 
trial judge denied Pedockie's request, finding that Pedockie had 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to an attorney. 
Pedockie then asked that standby counsel be excused from the case 
because the whole case was a "scam and a mockracy" and standby 
counsel was "just taking up the taxpayers' dollars." After 
explaining the benefits of having standby counsel who was trained 
in the law, the judge granted Pedockie's request, and Pedockie 
proceeded to represent himself. 
i|l9 The jury found Pedockie guilty of aggravated 
kidnapping, and he was sentenced. Pedockie appealed, arguing 
that he was deprived of his constitutional right to assistance of 
5 No. 20040746 
counsel.3 The court of appeals reversed Pedockie's conviction 
and remanded the case for a new trial. 
H2 0 The court of appeals first considered whether 
Pedockie's conduct evidenced a voluntary waiver of his right to 
counsel. Recognizing that a defendant's decision to waive 
counsel may be subject to constitutionally permissible 
constraints, the court of appeals reasoned that the trial judge 
reasonably required Pedockie to either accept representation by 
the PDA, hire private counsel, or proceed pro se. It therefore 
held that Pedockie had voluntarily waived his right to counsel 
through his conduct. 
1(21 The court of appeals then considered whether Pedockie's 
waiver was knowing and intelligent. Because the trial judge had 
failed to conduct an on-the-record colloquy with Pedockie to 
inform him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, the court of appeals was confronted with the 
question of whether the case involved "extraordinary 
circumstances" that would require a de novo review of the record. 
It concluded it need not decide that question because there was 
"nothing in the record to persuade [it] that [Pedockie's] waiver 
was knowing and intelligent."4 It therefore reversed Pedockie's 
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. 
H22 The State petitioned for certiorari, which we granted. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3) (a) .5 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f23 "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court."6 Whether Pedockie 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to 
counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.7 While we review 
questions of law for correctness, a trial court's factual 
3
 State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224, 1 1, 95 P.3d 1182. 
4
 isL 1 35. 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (2002) . 
6
 Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, % 4, 978 
P.2d 460. 
7
 State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1998) . 
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findings may be reversed on appeal only if they are clearly 
erroneous.8 
ANALYSIS 
124 The State urges us to find that Pedockie waived his 
right to counsel through his dilatory conduct and that he did so 
knowingly and intelligently. Whether a defendant may waive his 
right to counsel through his conduct is an issue of first 
impression in this court. We therefore begin by addressing the 
substantive requirements for waiver of a defendant's right to 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment and the procedure to be 
followed by appellate courts when reviewing cases of alleged 
waiver.9 With these substantive and procedural requirements in 
mind, we turn to the court of appeals' conclusion that Pedockie 
waived his right to counsel through his dilatory conduct but that 
the waiver was invalid because it was not knowing and 
intelligent. 
I. THE RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
^25 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees defendants the right to counsel in felony 
proceedings.10 As the United States Supreme Court articulated in 
Powell v. Alabama, "The right to be heard would be, in many 
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be 
heard by counsel."11 
[^26 Defendants also have the right to waive their right to 
counsel. The United States Supreme Court in Faretta v. 
California12 held that the Sixth Amendment implicitly guarantees 
criminal defendants the ability to waive their right to the 
assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. Before permitting a 
defendant to do so, however, a trial court should ensure that the 
8
 State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
9
 State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224, % 30 n.5, 95 P.3d 1182 
(noting that Pedockie did not preserve a state constitutional 
claim). 
10
 U.S. Const, amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence."). 
11
 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) . 
12
 422 U.S. 806, 818-32 (1975). 
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waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.13 A defendant 
should "be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, so that the record will establish that he knows 
what he is doing."14 
12 7 Courts have recognized three methods pursuant to which 
a defendant may give up his constitutional right to the 
assistance of counsel: waiver, forfeiture, and waiver by 
conduct.15 We outline the elements of each. 
A. True Waiver 
H28 True waiver is the most common method by which 
defendants forsake their right to counsel. True waiver typically 
occurs when a defendant affirmatively requests permission to 
proceed pro se.16 In State v. Bakalov. we required that 
defendants "clearly and unequivocally" request self-
representation in order to waive their right to counsel.17 
1|29 When a defendant requests to proceed pro se, his waiver 
will be valid only if he acts knowingly and intelligently, being 
aware of the dangers inherent in self-representation.1B The most 
reliable way for a trial court to determine whether a defendant 
is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation 
is to engage in a colloquy on the record. At times, however, we 
have found a waiver of the right to counsel absent a colloquy. 
For example, in State v. Frampton, we found that a defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel when he 
affirmatively requested to proceed pro se despite the fact that 
the trial court had not engaged in a colloquy.19 We reasoned 
that the defendant should have realized the "value of counsel" 
13
 See id. at 835. 
14
 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
15
 See United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099 (3d 
Cir. 1995) . 
16
 Id. 
17
 1999 UT 45, 1 16, 979 P.2d 799. 
18
 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. 
19
 737 P.2d 183, 187-89 (Utah 1987). 
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because he was represented by counsel in a prior trial.20 
Additionally, we concluded that he must have realized the 
seriousness of the charges filed against him because the judge 
had appointed standby counsel over his objection21 and the judge 
had explained the charges, including the maximum penalty 
associated therewith, in two prior trials involving the same 
charges .22 
1(30 True waiver does not apply in this case because 
Pedockie never expressed a desire to represent himself. To the 
contrary, the record is replete with instances of Pedockie 
insisting that he "want[ed] adequate counsel" and that he was 
"not going to represent [himself]." 
B. Forfeiture 
1131 While waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a 
known right, forfeiture occupies the opposite end of the 
spectrum. Unlike waiver, "forfeiture results in the loss of a 
right regardless of the defendant's knowledge thereof and 
irrespective of whether the defendant intended to relinquish the 
right."23 
f32 In United States v. Goldberg, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed that a defendant may be 
deemed to have forfeited his right to counsel when he engages in 
"extremely dilatory conduct" or abusive behavior, such as 
physically assaulting counsel.24 When circumstances are 
egregious enough to constitute forfeiture, a court need not 
determine whether a defendant understands the risks of self-
representation or warn him that he will lose his right to 
counsel. But because of its drastic nature, a defendant must 
engage in extreme conduct before forfeiture may be imposed.25 We 
find no basis for imposing forfeiture under the facts presented 
here. 
20
 Id. at 189. 
Id. at 189 n.19. 
Id. at 189. 
23
 United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d Cir. 
1995) . 
24
 Id. at 1101. 
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C. Waiver by Conduct 
1)3 3 Waiver by conduct, often referred to as implied waiver, 
combines elements of both true waiver and forfeiture.26 "Once a 
defendant has been warned that he will lose his attorney if he 
engages in dilatory tactics, any misconduct thereafter may be 
treated as an implied request to proceed pro se and thus, as a 
waiver of the right to counsel."27 The conduct required to give 
rise to an implied waiver does not have to be as extreme as that 
required for forfeiture. And unlike the situation in cases of 
true waiver, a defendant need not intend to relinquish the right 
to counsel.28 But the defendant must have been warned that 
continuation of the unacceptable conduct will result in a waiver 
of the right to counsel. As is the case in a true waiver 
situation, the waiver also must be knowing and intelligent. In 
other words, the defendant must have also possessed an awareness 
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation at the 
time of the implied waiver.29 
134 While the United States Supreme Court has never 
specifically addressed whether a defendant may waive the right to 
counsel through inappropriate conduct,30 it has recognized that a 
defendant may lose the constitutional right to be present at 
trial because of such conduct.31 In Illinois v. Allen, the trial 
court had warned the defendant that he would lose his right to be 
present at his trial because of his disruptive behavior, yet he 
continued "in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and 
disrespectful of the court that his trial [could not] be carried 
on with him in the courtroom."32 Consequently, he lost the 
constitutional right to be present, even though he did not 
affirmatively relinquish it.33 Thus, Allen suggests that a 
26
 Id. at 1100-01. 
27
 IdL. at 1100. 
Id. at 1101. 
29
 Id. at 1102. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). 
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. 
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defendant can lose constitutional rights because of his conduct 
so long as he is "aware of the consequences of his actions."34 
J^35 In United States v. Weninger,35 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied analogous analysis in 
holding that the defendant had waived his right to counsel by 
failing to secure an attorney for trial. The defendant was given 
ample time and was warned to obtain an attorney, but he 
strategically and stubbornly failed to do so.36 The Tenth 
Circuit held that this dilatory conduct should be treated as a 
request to proceed pro se.37 
^36 In summary, before we will find an implied waiver of 
the right to counsel based on a defendant's conduct, two 
requirements must be satisfied. First, the implied waiver must 
be voluntary. Second, the waiver must have been made knowingly 
and intelligently. 
^3 7 For an implied waiver to be voluntary, the trial court 
must warn the defendant of the specific conduct that will give 
rise to the waiver of his right to counsel. In other words, when 
a trial court believes that a defendant's conduct is unacceptable 
and will result in a waiver of his right to counsel, the court 
must warn the defendant that continuation of the unacceptable 
conduct will be treated as an implied request to proceed pro se 
and, thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel.38 This warning 
must be explicit so that a defendant clearly understands both the 
nature of the unacceptable conduct and the implications of any 
such future conduct. 
1(3 8 For an implied waiver to be knowing and intelligent, 
the trial court must ensure that the defendant is cognizant of 
34
 Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101 (emphasis added). 
35
 624 F.2d 163, 166-67 (10th Cir. 1980). 
36
 Id.; see also United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 694 
(7th Cir. 1992) (finding that the combination of the defendant's 
''ability to pay for counsel plus refusal to do so . . . waive [d] 
the right to counsel at trial"). 
37
 Weninger, 624 F.2d at 166-67; see also Goldberg, 67 F.3d 
at 1102-03 (refusing to find waiver by conduct because the court 
had not made the defendant aware of the risks of self-
representation) . 
38
 Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100-03. 
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the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The court 
should explain the consequences of a decision to proceed pro se 
and, at a minimum, must 
ascertain that the defendant possesses the 
intelligence and capacity to understand and 
appreciate the consequences of the decision 
to represent himself, including the 
expectation that the defendant will comply 
with technical rules and the recognition that 
presenting a defense is not just a matter of 
telling one's story; and . . . ascertain that 
the defendant comprehends the nature of the 
charges and proceedings, the range of 
permissible punishments, and any additional 
facts essential to a broad understanding of 
the case.39 
1|3 9 Trial courts generally evaluate a defendant's 
understanding and intelligence by conducting a colloquy on the 
record. In those cases where a defendant continues to insist on 
his right to counsel, it may seem awkward for a trial court to 
engage in a typical colloquy regarding the inherent dangers of 
self-representation. But we still strongly encourage trial 
courts to do so as a means to ensure that a defendant is aware of 
the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation.40 
II. DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A WAIVER 
f4 0 While we have urged that trial courts engage in an on-
the-record colloquy with defendants to ensure that they are aware 
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, we have 
not imposed an absolute requirement that they do so. Rather, we 
have recognized that the validity of a defendant's waiver turns 
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each 
case. 
1(41 Relying on admittedly confusing language from some of 
our prior cases, the court of appeals stated that, in the absence 
of a colloquy, appellate courts are required to conduct a de novo 
39
 State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 1998). 
40
 See Truiillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 575 (Wyo. 2000) 
(explaining that a warning in a waiver by conduct situation 
"should be comparable in content to the warning given to a 
defendant who affirmatively asserts his right to self-
representation") . 
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review of the record to determine the validity of a defendant's 
waiver of the right to counsel only in "extraordinary 
circumstances.7' It then concluded that it need not evaluate 
Pedockie's case for such extraordinary circumstances because 
>xthere is simply nothing in the record to persuade us that 
[Pedockie's] waiver was knowing and intelligent."41 
1142 We take this opportunity to clarify our prior case law 
regarding appellate review in cases involving waiver of the right 
to counsel. As previously stated, before we will accept a 
defendant's waiver of his right to counsel, we have required that 
he be "aware of the dangers and disadvantages[] of self-
representation,"42 and we continue to strongly recommend a 
colloquy on the record as the preferred method of determining 
whether a defendant is aware of these risks. Indeed, a trial 
court generally cannot determine a defendant's understanding 
without engaging in the "penetrating questioning" found in a 
colloquy.43 The sixteen-point colloquy found in State v. 
Frampton44 establishes a sound framework for efficient and 
complete questioning. Moreover, on appeal, such a colloquy 
provides the reviewing court with "xan objective basis for 
review7 upon the almost inevitable challenge to the waiver by the 
defendant who proceeds pro se and is subsequently convicted."45 
f43 In declining to review the record de novo, the court of 
appeals relied on State v. Heaton, where we held that a reviewing 
court could engage in de novo review only in "extraordinary 
circumstances."46 But in two cases following Heaton, we found 
that de novo review was appropriate in the absence of a colloquy 
and never indicated that such a review was dependent on the 
41
 State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224, 1 35, 95 P.3d 1182. 
42
 State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
43
 Id. 
44
 IcL_ at 187 n.12. 
45
 Wayne R. LaFave et al., 3 Criminal Procedure § 11.5(c) 
(2d ed. 1999) (quoting People v. Sawyer, 438 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 
(N.Y. 1982)); see also State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 
1998). 
46
 958 P.2d at 918. 
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existence of extraordinary circumstances.47 We now clarify that 
it is not. 
144 When this court stated in Heaton that a de novo review 
was appropriate only in extraordinary circumstances, we cited the 
Ninth Circuit case of Harding v. Lewis.46 But the Harding court 
actually allowed for de novo review absent a colloquy; it only 
explained that a valid waiver absent a colloquy should "rarely" 
be found.49 Our mistaken interpretation of Harding, combined 
with the fact that Heaton is inconsistent with this court's more 
recent decisions, suggests the need for us to rearticulate the 
procedure to be followed by reviewing courts when evaluating the 
validity of a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel in the 
absence of a colloquy.50 
K45 Absent a colloquy on the record, a reviewing court 
should review the record de novo to determine whether the 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 
counsel. De novo review is appropriate because the validity of a 
waiver does not turn upon "whether the trial judge actually 
conducted the colloquy,"51 but upon whether the defendant 
understood the consequences of waiver.52 A de novo review allows 
a reviewing court to analyze the "particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding each case" to make that 
determination.53 But we pause to note that, considering the 
strong presumption against waiver and the fundamental nature of 
the right to counsel, any doubts must be resolved in favor of the 
defendant. We therefore anticipate that reviewing courts will 
rarely find a valid waiver of the right to counsel absent a 
colloquy. 
47
 See State v. Hassan, 2004 UT 99, 1 22, 108 P.3d 695; 
State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, % 70, 63 P.3d 731. 
48
 834 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1987). 
49
 Id. 
50
 See Hassan, 2004 UT 99, 1 22; Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, 1 70; 
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 188 (Utah 1987). 
51
 Hassan, 2004 UT 99, 1 22. 
52
 Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188. 
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III. PEDOCKIE'S CASE 
1(46 We now turn to the particular facts of this case. This 
case is a prime example of the confusion and inconsistency that 
can permeate proceedings in the absence of an explicit warning 
and colloquy regarding the right to counsel. In the face of such 
confusion, we cannot find a voluntary, knowing, or intelligent 
waiver of Pedockie7s right to counsel. 
147 First, we conclude that Pedockie did not voluntarily 
waive his right to counsel through his conduct. While the trial 
judge repeatedly chastised Pedockie for his past unwillingness to 
follow counsel's advice, his statements with respect to 
Pedockie's right to appointed counsel were inconsistent and 
confusing. 
1|48 For example, when Retallick moved to withdraw, the 
trial judge warned Pedockie that he would need to either accept 
Retallick's advice, represent himself, or get his own attorney. 
But after Pedockie fired Retallick, the trial judge ordered a 
continuance, stating that "you're entitled to have an attorney 
represent you, and, obviously, Mr. Brass . . . hasn't had enough 
time to get ready." 
i|49 When Brass withdrew, the trial judge continued to scold 
Pedockie for prior delays and maintain that Pedockie would need 
to hire a private attorney or proceed pro se. Nevertheless, at 
the July 31 hearing, the trial judge agreed to "appoint the 
public defender's office for the third time" and gave every 
indication that the PDA attorney would act as primary, rather 
than standby, counsel. Pedockie relied on this statement when he 
failed to retain private counsel and appeared at the August 13 
hearing expecting representation by the PDA. He was thus 
understandably confused when the judge insisted that the PDA 
attorney's role was limited to that of standby counsel. It is 
particularly troubling that, after agreeing to appoint counsel on 
July 31, the trial judge never warned Pedockie of the conduct 
that would give rise to an implied waiver of his right to 
appointed counsel but nevertheless imposed such a waiver sometime 
between the July 31 and August 13 hearings when Pedockie does not 
appear to have engaged in any objectionable conduct. Because any 
uncertainty over an alleged waiver of the right to counsel must 
be resolved in favor of an accused, we are unable to find a 
voluntary waiver under these circumstances. 
1)5 0 Finally, even if Pedockie had voluntarily waived his 
right to counsel, our de novo review of the record fails to 
establish that any implied waiver was knowing and intelligent. 
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There is nothing in the record to indicate that, at the time of 
the alleged waiver, Pedockie appreciated "the consequences of the 
decision to represent himself, including the expectation that [he 
would need to] comply with technical rules and the recognition 
that presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling one's 
story."54 
i|51 Although the record does contain evidence that Pedockie 
wanted his case to be tried by an attorney because he knew 
"nothing about the law" and was not familiar with the rules of 
the court, such general knowledge does not necessarily evidence 
an understanding of the technical requirements inherent in 
presenting one's case. While Pedockie arguably obtained some 
understanding of these technical requirements during the course 
of the proceedings, the record is devoid of evidence that 
Pedockie understood these requirements prior to the time of the 
alleged waiver. For instance, Pedockie was informed of the 
technical rules of the court when the judge appointed standby 
counsel and explained that standby counsel could help prepare 
jury instructions and cross-examine and subpoena witnesses for 
trial but would not argue Pedockie's motions. By this point, 
however, the trial judge had already ruled that Pedockie was not 
entitled to appointment of primary counsel. Therefore, any 
knowledge that Pedockie may have had regarding the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation was too little, too late. 
CONCLUSION 
1|52 We agree with the court of appeals that Pedockie is 
entitled to a new trial. We have reviewed the record and 
conclude that Pedockie did not voluntarily, knowingly, or 
intelligently waive his right to the assistance of counsel. 
1)53 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, 
Justice Durrant, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish's 
opinion. 
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 1998). 
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